As Malaysia wraps up the first month of its 2025 ASEAN chairmanship, the recent Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Langkawi has sparked both curiosity and critique. Held on 19 January on the idyllic Malaysian island, the event saw foreign ministers from across Southeast Asia gather in a setting designed to foster camaraderie over formality. Yet, while some commentators have dismissed the retreat as mere symbolic posturing, others see it as a vital expression of ASEAN’s unique approach to diplomacy—one rooted in dialogue, trust-building, and a steadfast aversion to force.
A Quiet Tradition of ‘Retreat Diplomacy’
The Langkawi Retreat, hosted by Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan, is part of a long-standing ASEAN tradition often termed ‘Retreat Diplomacy’ or ‘Conference Diplomacy’. Unlike the rigid structures of formal summits, these retreats prioritise intimate, face-to-face discussions, often without the heavy presence of translators or large entourages. The goal is not to produce immediate policy outcomes but to lay the groundwork for mutual understanding—a subtle yet critical process in a region as diverse as Southeast Asia.
This approach traces its roots to the 1976 Bali Summit, where ASEAN’s founding members—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines—crafted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). A landmark agreement, the TAC explicitly rejected the use of force in regional disputes, setting a tone of peaceful resolution that has defined ASEAN’s ethos ever since. As early dialogue partners like Australia (1974) and Canada (1977) joined the fold, they too embraced this division between ‘defensive diplomacy’—focused on dialogue—and any inclination toward military posturing. 
The significance of such retreats lies in their informality. As Japanese scholars like Sato Seizaburo and Yamakage Susumu have noted, these early-year gatherings allow ministers to confer privately in a ‘cosy’ atmosphere, free from the pressures of media leaks or public scrutiny. This method, often misunderstood by critics as ‘talks for the sake of talks’, has been instrumental in preventing the escalation of tensions within the region. Indeed, according to the East Asian School of Peace, ASEAN has reduced combatant fatalities from inter-state conflicts by an impressive 99% since 1979, a record that places it alongside the European Union as one of the world’s most successful regional organisations.
Misunderstandings and Missteps
Despite its historical success, ‘Retreat Diplomacy’ remains a point of contention. Some scholars, particularly from newer ASEAN members like Vietnam and Myanmar (which joined in 1997), have conflated the practice with initiatives attributed to Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999. This misreading overlooks the deeper origins of the concept, which were shaped by regional stalwarts like Singapore’s Goh Chok Tong and Lee Kuan Yew as early as the 1980s. Their vision, shared by leaders in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, was to create a space for candid dialogue unmarred by formal agendas or adversarial posturing.
Critics like Bridget Welsh have pointed to the Langkawi Retreat’s lack of a joint statement on pressing issues—such as the ongoing crisis in Myanmar or escalating tariff disputes—as evidence of Malaysia’s faltering chairmanship. However, such criticism may miss the point. Retreats are not designed to yield immediate resolutions or public declarations beyond a Chairman’s Statement, which in this case was issued by Malaysia alone. Instead, they serve as a prelude to more formal discussions at events like the ASEAN Coordination Council (ACC) in April or May, and ultimately the ASEAN Summit.
The absence of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who was on official visits to Dubai, London, and Davos during the retreat, has also drawn scrutiny. Yet, this too aligns with the retreat’s ethos: the focus is on ministerial-level trust-building, not top-tier political theatre. To judge Malaysia’s chairmanship on a single event—or the absence of a leader—risks ignoring the broader, incremental nature of ASEAN’s diplomatic framework.
The Bigger Picture: ASEAN’s ‘Soft Institutionalism’
Beyond the Langkawi Retreat, ASEAN’s approach to diplomacy has been lauded for what academics term ‘soft institutionalism’. This concept, explored in courses like Harvard’s ‘Asia’s Soft Institutionalism’ under scholars Ezra Vogel and Paul Evans, highlights the region’s preference for dialogue over rigid structures. It’s a method that extends beyond foreign ministers to include defence ministers, senior officials, and even Track 1.5 and Track 2 thinkers—non-official scholars and diplomats who contribute to policy discourse under frameworks like the Chatham House Rule, ensuring candidness without formal attribution.
This informality has fostered a ‘Dialogical Society’, a term resonant with figures like Anwar Ibrahim and echoed in Malaysian academic circles. It’s a space where ideas flow freely, unencumbered by fixed agendas—a principle dating back to the Helsinki Summit of 1972-1975 and localised by think tanks like Jakarta’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). At Langkawi, this manifested in discussions guided not by a rigid checklist but by what social psychologist Herbert Kelman calls ‘forgiveness transactional psychology’—a process of building trust through non-adversarial dialogue.
Such methods have tangible outcomes. The resolution of the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute over Preah Vihear, for instance, owes much to ASEAN’s quiet, persistent diplomacy. Even on Myanmar—a persistent challenge under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, which urges regional solutions to conflicts—ASEAN’s Five-Point Jakarta Consensus, starting with a call for a total ceasefire, reflects this commitment to dialogue, despite slow progress. As UN Special Envoy Julie Bishop recently acknowledged to Anwar and other leaders, peace in Myanmar remains elusive, yet the region’s approach continues to prioritise patience over posturing.
Challenges in a Turbulent 2025
As 2025 unfolds, the global landscape presents ASEAN with unprecedented challenges—from economic uncertainties to geopolitical rivalries. The Langkawi Retreat, while not addressing these head-on, served as a reminder of the region’s strength: its ability to convene, converse, and build consensus away from the spotlight. For Malaysia, chairing ASEAN at such a juncture offers both opportunity and scrutiny. The country must navigate not only regional expectations but also domestic priorities, all while maintaining the delicate balance of ASEAN’s non-confrontational style.
Critics who dismiss the retreat as inconsequential may be overlooking its symbolic and practical value. In a region of 700 million people, no single event—or clairvoyant analysis—can dictate outcomes. Instead, ASEAN’s success lies in its layered processes, from retreats to summits, from ministerial meetings to the input of bodies like the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CIP) and the ASEAN Secretariat. A dynamic Secretary-General, enjoying ministerial rank, further aids this by facilitating direct engagement with leaders like Anwar.
The Langkawi Retreat may not have produced headlines or resolved crises, but it wasn’t meant to. It was a salvo—akin to the fireworks of the Gregorian New Year or the Lunar New Year celebrated across the region on 29 January 2025—marking the start of Malaysia’s stewardship. As the year progresses, events like the National Security Council’s retreat in Terengganu and the East Asia Summit (EAS) will build on this foundation, addressing issues from Myanmar’s unrest to economic tensions.
For now, Malaysia’s chairmanship shows early promise not through grand gestures but through fidelity to ASEAN’s quiet strength. If ‘Retreat Diplomacy’ teaches anything, it’s that in Southeast Asia, progress often begins not with a bang, but with a conversation. Whether that conversation will yield the breakthroughs needed in 2025 remains to be seen, but the region’s track record suggests it’s a method worth trusting.
