In a significant step towards addressing the escalating issue of cross-border crime, China and Myanmar have pledged to deepen law enforcement and security cooperation, focusing on curbing online gambling and telecom fraud networks operating in the volatile Thailand-Myanmar border region. The commitment, announced following high-level talks in Myanmar, comes as scam hubs in areas like Myawaddy—a border town opposite Thailand’s Mae Sot—continue to threaten the safety and property of citizens across the region, including those from China and Thailand.
The discussions, held on 16 February, involved senior officials from both nations, including Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Ma Jia and Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongyi, alongside Myanmar’s Deputy Prime Minister U Than Swe and Union Minister for Home Affairs Lieutenant-General Tun Tun Naung. According to a statement from the Chinese embassy in Myanmar, the talks centred on establishing a regular mechanism to combat cross-border crimes, with Myanmar officials outlining concrete steps to tackle online scams and strengthen coordination with China and neighbouring countries.
A Growing Regional Threat
The Thailand-Myanmar border, particularly around Myawaddy, has long been a hotspot for illicit activities, exacerbated by political instability in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup. Scam networks operating out of compounds like KK Park and Shwe Kokko have gained notoriety for exploiting vulnerable individuals, often luring them with false job promises only to trap them in forced labour schemes involving online fraud. Victims, many of whom are foreign nationals including Chinese citizens, face severe human rights abuses, with reports of coercion, violence, and restricted movement.
Chinese officials have repeatedly highlighted the severity of the issue, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun stating at a news conference on 17 February that “the recent surge in online gambling and telecom fraud in the Thailand-Myanmar border areas has endangered the lives and property of citizens in several countries.” Guo underscored the need for comprehensive measures to address the root causes of these crimes, which he said disrupt normal exchanges and cooperation in the region.
During the talks, Myanmar reiterated its commitment to protecting foreign nationals, including Chinese citizens, and pledged to enhance bilateral and multilateral efforts. One immediate outcome has been the transfer of 261 victims rescued from scam hubs in Myawaddy to Thai authorities for repatriation, a move that signals growing cooperation between the two nations.
Thailand’s Role and Recent Actions
Thailand, which shares a porous border with Myanmar, has also taken decisive steps to disrupt scam operations. On 5 February, Thai authorities cut electricity, internet services, and fuel supplies to five areas of Myanmar, including Myawaddy, in a bid to cripple the infrastructure supporting these criminal networks. The move reflects Thailand’s frustration with the spillover effects of Myanmar’s internal challenges, as well as pressure from regional partners like China to act.
Liu Zhongyi, the Chinese Assistant Minister of Public Security, visited Mae Sot on 18 February, just across from Myawaddy, to assess the situation firsthand. This followed an earlier visit to Thailand two weeks prior, during which he urged Thai authorities to intensify efforts against scam networks. Liu’s presence in the region underscores China’s determination to protect its citizens and highlights the transnational nature of the problem, which affects not only China and Myanmar but also Thailand and beyond.
For Thailand, the issue is both a security and humanitarian concern. The border town of Mae Sot, in Tak province, serves as a critical crossing point for trade and migration but has also become a gateway for criminal activities. Thai officials have faced criticism for inconsistent enforcement, with some alleging that local corruption enables scam hubs to operate with relative impunity on the Myanmar side. However, recent actions suggest a shift towards tougher measures, likely spurred by international pressure and the growing scale of the crisis.
China’s Strategic Interest
China’s involvement in addressing cross-border crime in the region is driven by a combination of domestic and strategic priorities. The protection of Chinese nationals abroad is a key concern for Beijing, particularly as reports of citizens being trafficked or trapped in scam operations have sparked public outrage at home. Beyond this, China has significant economic and geopolitical interests in Myanmar, including infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, which are often disrupted by instability near the border.
By fostering closer security ties with Myanmar, China also seeks to bolster its influence in a country that has become increasingly isolated since the coup. The military junta in Naypyidaw, facing widespread international condemnation, has leaned heavily on Beijing for diplomatic and economic support. In return, China appears to be leveraging this relationship to push for stronger action against criminal networks that threaten regional stability—a priority shared by other ASEAN nations.
However, China’s approach is not without challenges. Analysts note that while Myanmar’s government has expressed willingness to cooperate, its control over border areas like Myawaddy is limited. Much of the region falls under the influence of ethnic armed organisations and local militias, some of which are believed to profit from or tolerate scam operations. This fragmented authority complicates efforts to dismantle criminal networks and raises questions about the feasibility of long-term solutions.
Regional Implications and Future Steps
The agreement between China and Myanmar to establish a regular mechanism for combating cross-border crime marks a potential turning point, but its success will depend on sustained cooperation and the involvement of other regional actors. Thailand, as a key stakeholder, will need to maintain pressure on scam hubs while addressing domestic issues such as border security and corruption. Meanwhile, broader ASEAN engagement could help coordinate a more unified response, though political divisions within the bloc—particularly over how to handle Myanmar’s junta—may hinder progress.
For now, the focus remains on immediate actions such as information-sharing, legal action against perpetrators, and the repatriation of victims. Chinese and Myanmar officials have discussed measures to rescue and support trapped nationals, as well as to expel foreigners who enter Myanmar illegally to work in scam centres. These steps, while critical, are only part of the solution to a deeply entrenched problem that thrives on poverty, conflict, and weak governance.
A Shared Regional Aspiration
As Guo Jiakun noted, combating cross-border crime is not just a matter of national interest but a shared aspiration among regional nations. The human toll of online gambling and telecom fraud—measured in shattered lives and broken families—transcends borders, affecting communities in China, Thailand, Myanmar, and beyond. If successful, the collaboration between China and Myanmar could set a precedent for addressing other transnational challenges in South East Asia, from human trafficking to drug smuggling.
Yet, the road ahead is fraught with obstacles. The Thailand-Myanmar border remains a volatile frontier, where criminal networks adapt quickly to enforcement measures. For the people of Mae Sot and Myawaddy, caught between the fallout of Myanmar’s conflict and the reach of organised crime, the promise of enhanced security cooperation offers hope—but only if it translates into tangible change on the ground.
In the meantime, the international community watches closely. The outcome of this partnership may not only shape the fight against cross-border crime but also influence the delicate balance of power and influence in a region long defined by its complexities.