Thaksin Shinawatra’s Legacy and the Unresolved Conflict in Thailand’s Deep South

In Thailand’s southernmost provinces, a simmering conflict that has claimed over 7,500 lives since 2004 continues to defy resolution. The roots of this unrest are often traced back to the administration of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose imposition of special security laws and hardline policies marked a turning point in the region’s history. Now, as violence intensifies under the current government led by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin’s daughter, questions linger over whether the Shinawatra family’s political legacy can pivot from conflict to peace in the Deep South.

The region, encompassing Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, has been under martial law and an Emergency Decree since 2004, measures introduced by Thaksin following violent incidents like the Pi-Leng Camp weapons raid and the burning of 18 schools. These laws grant sweeping powers to the military, including the ability to detain suspects without warrants for up to seven days, extendable by police for another 30. Reports of intimidation and torture in military camps have long tainted these policies, fuelling resentment among local communities, predominantly ethnic Malay Muslims, who feel alienated from the Buddhist-majority Thai state.

A Legacy of Violence: Krue Se and Tak Bai

Thaksin’s tenure is indelibly linked to two tragic events that symbolise the heavy-handed approach of his administration. On 28 April 2004, the Krue Se Mosque incident in Pattani saw 108 people killed, including 30 inside the mosque itself. Many of the deceased were young men, aged between 15 and 20, armed only with rudimentary weapons like machetes. Just months later, on 25 October 2004, the Tak Bai crackdown in Narathiwat became one of the deadliest episodes in the conflict’s history. Over 85 people died, most suffocating during transport in military trucks where detainees were forced to lie face down, stacked atop one another, for hours.

The Tak Bai incident remains a raw wound for many in the Deep South. As the 20-year statute of limitations expired in October 2024, attempts by victims’ families to seek justice were thwarted when no state officials appeared in court. Thaksin, speaking on the social media platform Clubhouse in 2021 while in exile, expressed regret but distanced himself from direct responsibility, stating, “I feel sorry for what happened. Most of it was under military control. I barely remember. Sorry.” His words, while an apology of sorts, have done little to heal the scars of those affected.

Security Over Dialogue: Thaksin’s Hardline Approach

Thaksin’s initial response to the unrest was dismissive, famously declaring in 2004 that there was “no separatism, no ideological terrorists, only petty criminals” in the region. His frustration with the military’s perceived failures was evident in his harsh rebuke: “If you have an entire battalion stationed there but still fail to be cautious, then you deserve to die.” This rhetoric, combined with the introduction of draconian security measures, set the tone for a crackdown-based approach rather than dialogue.

Under his leadership, nearly half a trillion baht was allocated to manage security and development through bodies like the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) Region 4 Forward Command. Yet, critics argue that these funds prioritised militarisation over addressing root causes such as cultural and economic marginalisation. Between 2004 and 2023, data from the Southern Situation Monitoring Centre recorded 2,296 violent incidents, resulting in 7,547 deaths and 14,028 injuries—a grim testament to the failure of security-centric policies to bring lasting peace.

Shifting Towards Peace: Later Initiatives

Despite the violence associated with his early policies, Thaksin’s political network has not entirely shunned dialogue. During the administration of his sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, Thailand initiated formal peace talks with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a key insurgent group, facilitated by Malaysia. The Ramadan Peace Initiative, an agreement to halt violence during the Muslim holy month, emerged as a significant step forward. Even under subsequent governments, including the military-led regime of General Prayut Chan-o-cha, peace efforts persisted with proposals like the Joint Comprehensive Peace Plan (JCPP) Roadmap for Peace in 2023 and the establishment of “pilot safety zones.”

When the Pheu Thai Party, closely tied to the Shinawatra family, returned to power in 2023 under Srettha Thavisin, economic development was prioritised as a pathway to stability. Srettha highlighted the halal industry as a potential driver for growth in the region, while the appointment of Chatchai Bangchuad as the first civilian chief peace negotiator signalled a shift towards civilian-led efforts. However, under the current administration of Paetongtarn Shinawatra, no official peace dialogue team has been appointed, and the Emergency Decree has been extended for the 79th time. Violence has reportedly intensified, leaving many in the region and beyond questioning the government’s strategy.

Thaksin’s Return: A Chance for Redemption?

Thaksin’s recent visit to the Deep South, coupled with his role as an ASEAN adviser—where he has been vocal on Myanmar’s civil war—has sparked cautious optimism. Some hope he might leverage his influence to revive stalled negotiations. Reports suggest he could revisit the “66/23” model, a policy used by former Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda to reintegrate Communist insurgents in the 1980s. However, academics and activists argue this approach is outdated and ill-suited to the complex ethnic and ideological dimensions of the southern conflict.

At a forum in June 2022 on the future of Patani and the southern border provinces, Thaksin endorsed the principle of “politics leading the military,” advocating for genuine dialogue over militarised responses. Whether this stance will translate into tangible action under his daughter’s administration remains uncertain. For many in the Deep South, the Shinawatra name evokes both the pain of past crackdowns and the faint promise of political solutions.

### The Path Ahead: Dialogue or Deadlock?

The insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South is not merely a security issue but a deeply rooted conflict involving identity, governance, and historical grievances. While Thaksin’s early policies entrenched a cycle of violence, later initiatives under his political allies have shown that dialogue, however imperfect, can yield results. The Ramadan ceasefire and pilot safety zones are small but meaningful steps, yet they are insufficient without a comprehensive framework that prioritises local voices and addresses systemic inequalities.

If Thaksin is to play a constructive role, as some speculate he might, his approach must evolve beyond symbolic gestures or recycled policies. A renewed commitment to dialogue, as he advocated in 2022, could provide a foundation, but it must be matched by concrete actions—such as appointing a dedicated peace dialogue team and reconsidering the Emergency Decree’s prolonged enforcement. Without these, the risk of further violence looms large, perpetuating a conflict that has already spanned two decades.

For the people of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, the stakes could not be higher. The question is whether the Shinawatra legacy, once defined by crackdowns like Tak Bai, can redefine itself through peace. As violence surges again, the answer remains frustratingly out of reach, leaving a region—and a nation—yearning for resolution.