Thailand has issued a stark warning to Myanmar, threatening to slash power supplies to two border towns notorious for hosting large-scale online scam operations and human trafficking networks. Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai announced that the National Security Council (NSC), which he chairs, plans to reduce electricity to Shwe Kokko and KK Park in Myawaddy, Myanmar, by 50% as an initial measure to pressure authorities into cracking down on criminal activities.
This unprecedented move underscores growing frustration in Bangkok over the unchecked proliferation of call-centre gangs and illegal enterprises along the porous Thai-Myanmar border. If Myanmar fails to act, Phumtham warned, harsher measures—including a complete power cut—could follow, raising questions about the humanitarian and diplomatic fallout of such a decision.
Shwe Kokko and KK Park, both located across the Moei River from Mae Sot in Thailand’s Tak province, have become synonymous with organised crime in South East Asia. Shwe Kokko, often described as a hub for Chinese-run scam syndicates, is infamous for online fraud operations that ensnare victims from across the region. Reports suggest these schemes frequently rely on trafficked individuals forced into fraudulent work under brutal conditions. The town also hosts casinos and gambling dens, many operating outside any legal framework, drawing criminal elements to an already volatile border zone.
KK Park, similarly positioned along the river, mirrors these issues, with sprawling compounds dedicated to call-centre scams and other illicit activities. The proximity to Thailand—mere metres across the Moei River—has long facilitated cross-border crime, exploiting lax enforcement and political instability in Myanmar, particularly in the wake of the 2021 military coup.
Phumtham’s announcement on 4 February 2025 followed a high-level NSC meeting where security agencies unanimously agreed on the need for decisive action. “We cannot allow these criminal networks to operate with impunity so close to our borders,” he stated, highlighting the dual threat of online scams defrauding Thai citizens and the humanitarian crisis of trafficked individuals trapped in these towns.
The decision to target electricity supply marks a significant escalation in Thailand’s approach. Thailand provides power to parts of Myanmar as a humanitarian gesture, supporting local populations in areas where infrastructure is limited. However, Phumtham emphasised that this aid should not indirectly sustain criminal enterprises. “We must balance the welfare of innocent civilians with the urgent need to disrupt these illegal operations,” he said during a press briefing in Bangkok.
As a first step, the NSC has instructed the Foreign Ministry to engage with Myanmar’s authorities, urging them to dismantle the scam networks. Should these diplomatic efforts fail, a 50% reduction in power supply will serve as a warning shot, with Phumtham hinting at a full cutoff if compliance remains elusive. He plans to visit Mae Sot on Thursday to assess the situation firsthand and issue clearer directives on the power reduction. During this visit, he also vowed to crack down on corrupt officials facilitating cross-border crime, a persistent issue in the region.
The strategy is not without precedent. Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra previously called for the Interior Ministry to sever power to the towns, though Interior Minister Anutin Charnvirakul clarified that such authority rested solely with the NSC. Phumtham’s leadership of the council now places him at the forefront of this contentious policy, navigating the fine line between security imperatives and humanitarian considerations.
The issue extends beyond bilateral relations between Thailand and Myanmar, drawing in regional players like China, whose nationals are often implicated in running these scam operations. On 28 January 2025, Liu Zhongyi, China’s Assistant Minister of Public Security, revealed to Thailand’s Central Investigation Bureau that 36 major Chinese-run call-centre scams, employing over 100,000 fraudsters, operate in the Myawaddy area. This staggering figure underscores the scale of the problem and the challenges of policing a border region mired in conflict and weak governance.
Phumtham confirmed he would meet Liu at the Defence Ministry in Bangkok on 5 February 2025 to discuss collaborative efforts to combat these gangs. The talks are expected to focus on intelligence sharing and coordinated action, given the transnational nature of the crimes. Many victims of these scams hail from across Asia, including China, Thailand, and beyond, lured by false job promises only to find themselves trapped in exploitative conditions—a modern form of human trafficking that has drawn international condemnation.
The involvement of Chinese syndicates also complicates the geopolitical landscape. Myanmar’s Kayin (Karen) state, where Myawaddy is located, has long been a contested region, with ethnic armed groups and the central military junta vying for control. The power vacuum has allowed criminal networks to flourish, often with tacit or overt support from local factions. Thailand’s move to cut power risks inflaming tensions with these groups, some of whom rely on electricity from across the border for basic needs.
While the power reduction targets criminal hubs, it inevitably raises concerns about collateral damage to civilian populations in Shwe Kokko and KK Park. Many residents, unrelated to the scam operations, depend on Thai-supplied electricity for daily life. A 50% cut, let alone a full blackout, could disrupt access to essentials like lighting, refrigeration, and medical equipment, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation in Myanmar, where conflict and economic collapse have displaced millions.
Phumtham acknowledged these concerns, stressing that the NSC’s approach would prioritise dialogue with Myanmar’s government before implementing harsher measures. Yet, given the limited sway of Myanmar’s military regime over border areas like Myawaddy—where ethnic militias often hold more power than central authorities—the effectiveness of such talks remains uncertain. If power cuts proceed, Thailand could face accusations of exacerbating civilian suffering, potentially straining relations with both Myanmar and international aid organisations.
Moreover, the move sets a precedent for using infrastructure as leverage in cross-border disputes, a tactic that could backfire if Myanmar retaliates by restricting Thai access to border trade routes or escalating military presence along the Moei River. Mae Sot, a key economic hub for Thailand, relies heavily on cross-border commerce, and any disruption could have ripple effects on local livelihoods.
Thailand’s strategy reflects a broader regional struggle to address the intersection of technology and crime. Online scams, often targeting vulnerable populations with promises of quick riches, have surged across South East Asia, facilitated by the anonymity of digital platforms and the difficulty of prosecuting perpetrators across borders. The Myawaddy scam hubs are just one node in a sprawling network that spans Cambodia, Laos, and beyond, often dubbed the “scam belt” of the Mekong region.
For Thailand, the stakes are particularly high. The kingdom has invested heavily in positioning itself as a regional leader in security and economic development, yet the persistence of border crime undermines these ambitions. Phumtham’s pledge to root out corrupt officials during his Mae Sot visit signals an intent to tackle internal complicity, a longstanding barrier to effective enforcement. Bribery and collusion at checkpoints have historically enabled trafficking and smuggling, with border guards often turning a blind eye for personal gain.
If successful, the power reduction could serve as a model for disrupting criminal infrastructure without direct military intervention—a softer but still potent tool in the fight against transnational crime. However, its success hinges on Myanmar’s willingness to cooperate, a variable beyond Bangkok’s control given the fractured political landscape across the border.
As Phumtham prepares for his border visit and discussions with Chinese officials, the international community will be watching closely. The outcome of these efforts could reshape Thailand’s approach to border security and set a tone for how South East Asian nations tackle the growing scourge of online crime and human trafficking.
For now, the threat of power cuts looms over Shwe Kokko and KK Park, a symbolic and practical challenge to the criminal networks thriving in the shadows of conflict. Whether this gambit forces Myanmar’s hand or merely deepens the region’s woes remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: the Moei River, long a lifeline for trade and migration, has become a frontline in a new kind of battle—one fought not with guns, but with scams, exploitation, and the flick of a power switch.