Singapore is gearing up for its next general election, expected in the first half of 2025, with significant changes to its electoral landscape. On 11 March, the Elections Department announced that the government has accepted the recommendations of the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee (EBRC), ushering in a redrawing of constituency boundaries that will reshape the political battleground. The revisions include the creation of a new group representation constituency (GRC), an additional single-member constituency (SMC), and an increase in the number of elected Members of Parliament (MPs) from 93 to 97.
This overhaul, detailed in the EBRC’s report, marks a pivotal moment in Singapore’s tightly managed democratic process. With 22 of the current 31 constituencies seeing boundary changes, the adjustments reflect demographic shifts and population growth, particularly in areas like Pasir Ris-Punggol, Sembawang, and Tampines GRCs. Political observers suggest the changes could influence electoral outcomes in key battlegrounds, especially in the east and west of the city-state, where past elections have been fiercely contested. Beyond the numbers, the EBRC’s decision to provide reasoning for its recommendations—a departure from decades of minimal explanation—has sparked discussions on transparency and fairness in Singapore’s political system.
A Shifting Electoral Map
The most notable changes include the creation of a new four-member Punggol GRC, carved out of Punggol West SMC and parts of Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC, which itself will be reconfigured into a smaller four-member Pasir Ris-Changi GRC. The total number of GRCs will rise to 18, while SMCs will increase to 15. Among the SMCs, five—Bukit Batok, Hong Kah North, MacPherson, Punggol West, and Yuhua—have been dissolved, while six new ones, including Bukit Gombak and Jalan Kayu, have been established, mostly from existing GRCs. 
In the east, a region known for tight electoral races, the new Pasir Ris-Changi GRC merges parts of Pasir Ris-Punggol and East Coast GRCs. East Coast GRC, which saw a close contest in 2020 with the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) securing just 53.39% of the vote against the Workers’ Party (WP), will absorb areas from Marine Parade GRC. Meanwhile, a new five-member Marine Parade-Braddell Heights GRC will incorporate the former MacPherson SMC and parts of Potong Pasir, reflecting population growth in the Bidadari area.
The west, another hotspot of electoral competition, sees the formation of a new five-member West Coast-Jurong West GRC, taking in estates from Jurong West and Taman Jurong. West Coast GRC, where the PAP narrowly won with 51.69% against the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) in 2020, will cede some areas to Tanjong Pagar GRC. Additionally, a new Jurong East-Bukit Batok GRC will absorb parts of dissolved SMCs like Bukit Batok and Yuhua.
The EBRC attributed these changes to significant voter growth—over 10,000 additional voters per constituency since the 2020 general election (GE2020)—in areas driven by new housing developments. An estimated 2,753,226 voters are expected to cast their ballots in 2025, up by more than 100,000 from GE2020. Despite the extensive revisions, nine constituencies, including opposition-held Sengkang GRC and Aljunied GRC (with minor adjustments), remain unchanged.
Gerrymandering: Transparency or Tactical Manoeuvring?
For the first time in decades, the EBRC has offered explanations for its boundary decisions, a move political analysts interpret as a response to longstanding calls for greater transparency. Past reports since the 1990s provided little to no justification for changes, often fuelling speculation about political motivations behind boundary redrawings. Critics have historically argued that such adjustments disproportionately affect opposition strongholds, potentially diluting their voter base.
The EBRC, comprising five senior civil servants, was tasked with maintaining the average size of GRCs and the proportion of MPs from SMCs while keeping the voter-to-MP ratio stable. The result sees a slight decrease in the average number of MPs per GRC (from 4.65 to 4.56) and a marginal increase in the proportion of MPs elected from SMCs (from 15.1% to 15.5%). The average number of voters per MP will remain roughly constant at around 28,384.
While the EBRC’s justifications focus on demographic shifts, opposition parties have expressed mixed reactions. PSP secretary-general Hazel Poa welcomed the added transparency but argued that “much of the EBRC’s decision-making remains unexplained” and questioned the need for “drastic changes” to major boundaries. The WP, which holds Aljunied and Sengkang GRCs, noted the “significant changes” to areas where it has been active, promising to reveal its election strategy and candidates in due course.
The PAP, meanwhile, stated that its branches would adapt to the new boundaries while continuing to address residents’ needs. In a Facebook post, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong confirmed the report’s submission, highlighting the upcoming certification of the Registers of Electors as the next step before calling the election.
Strategic Implications for GE2025
The boundary changes carry significant implications for Singapore’s political landscape, particularly in constituencies with a history of close races. East Coast and West Coast GRCs, both narrowly won by the PAP in 2020, remain focal points. The reconfiguration of East Coast, incorporating parts of Marine Parade, and West Coast, losing areas to Tanjong Pagar, could alter voter dynamics in unpredictable ways. If population shifts in these areas have brought in demographics less aligned with the ruling party, the PAP may face stiffer challenges—though this remains speculative and unconfirmed by current data.
Similarly, the redrawing of boundaries in opposition-leaning areas like Aljunied GRC, where three polling districts in Tampines West have been moved to Tampines GRC, could impact the WP’s hold. While the party has not commented directly on this specific change, such adjustments often spark debate about whether they are intended to weaken opposition strongholds. Without evidence, however, such claims remain conjecture, and the EBRC’s stated rationale of balancing voter numbers must be taken at face value.
The creation of new constituencies like Punggol GRC and the dissolution of SMCs like Bukit Batok also raise questions about candidate deployment. Opposition parties, often resource-constrained compared to the PAP, may need to reassess their strategies to cover both new and reconfigured areas. The WP and PSP have indicated they will study the changes before announcing their plans, suggesting a cautious approach to navigating the altered electoral map.
The Road to Polling Day
The release of the EBRC report is a key milestone on the path to GE2025, with the next steps including the dissolution of Parliament and the issuance of the Writ of Election, which sets Nomination Day. Historically, the period between the EBRC report and Polling Day has ranged from two to four months, pointing to a likely election window between May and July 2025. A mandatory nine-day campaign period and a Cooling-off Day, during which campaigning is prohibited, will precede the vote.
As Singaporeans await further developments, the boundary changes underscore the high stakes of the upcoming election. With an expanded electorate and a reconfigured political map, both the PAP and opposition parties face new challenges and opportunities. The ruling party, which has dominated Singapore’s politics since independence, will aim to solidify its grip, while opposition groups seek to build on recent gains in areas like Sengkang and Aljunied.
A Test of Democratic Resilience
Beyond the immediate electoral implications, the EBRC’s report and the government’s acceptance of its recommendations reflect broader themes in Singapore’s political evolution. The move towards greater transparency, even if limited, signals a responsiveness to public and political demands for clarity in governance processes. Yet, the persistence of unexplained aspects of the boundary review process, as highlighted by opposition leaders, suggests that trust in the system remains a work in progress.
As the city-state prepares for GE2025, the interplay of demographic change, electoral strategy, and public sentiment will shape the outcome. For now, the redrawn boundaries set the stage for a contest that could test the resilience of Singapore’s unique democratic model—a system that balances strict political control with periodic expressions of voter choice. Whether these changes will tilt the scales in favour of continuity or change remains to be seen, but the battle lines, both literal and figurative, have been drawn.
